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ESSAY
ETHICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND
MEANINGFUL WORK
William H. Simon*
Much of the anxiety and dissatisfaction associated with legal ethics
arises from the categorical quality of the bar's dominant norms. These
norms take the form of relatively inflexible rules insensitive to all but a
few of the circumstances of the cases they govern. Hence they often require the lawyer to take actions that contribute to injustice or to refrain
from actions that would avert injustice.
For example, many lawyers believe that a criminal defender is
obliged to impeach a truthful complaining witness even though the only
immediate purpose of this tactic is to encourage the trier to draw a mistaken inference.' And it seems fairly clear that the bar's current confidentiality rules prevent a lawyer from disclosing client secrets even in
situations where disclosure would be necessary to save an innocent person wrongly convicted of a crime.2
Of course, to the bar, these injustices are redeemed by some
broader or more long-run justice that the rules ultimately serve. I and
others have argued against this currently dominant view ("Dominant
View") in favor of a more contextual regime of ethics norms that give
lawyers more immediate and direct responsibility to seek justice in the

Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford University;
Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. This Essay is part of a larger study,
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETICS, which will be published in 1998 by
the Harvard University Press.
1. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 43-58
(1975).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6 (1997); Symposium, Executing
the Wrong Person: The Professionals' Ethical Dilemmas, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1543 (1996)
(based on a hypothetical situation where a client discloses to his lawyer that he earlier killed a person and an innocent person was scheduled to be executed for that crime).
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particular case. Most of our critique of the Dominant View has focused
on matters of fairness as between clients and third parties and the public.
Here I want to pursue a different aspect of the critique of the
Dominant View--one that is in some respects more peripheral yet nevertheless important. This is the effect of the dominant categorical ethics
regime on the lawyer's sense of pride and satisfaction in her work. An
often overlooked cost of the Dominant View is that it promotes a dispiriting alienation of the lawyer from her work. The current regime betrays an ideal of "meaningful work" that has long underpinned the
morally ambitious images of the profession. This ideal has been a major
source of the attractions of the profession to morally ambitious people,
and its betrayal is a major source of the moral anxiety and disappointment that is so widely expressed now.
The argument is necessarily speculative and impressionistic. Some
of its most important sources are in literature and social theory, but I
hope to show that the vision of professionalism as meaningful work
most vividly expressed outside the profession mirrored and influenced
critical developments within the profession.
I begin in Part I by invoking a notion of alienation that literature
and social theory portray as a core problem of modernity. I then recall
in Part II how certain central features of professionalism, especially
American legal professionalism, have been embraced and defended as
remedies to this problem of alienation and as supports of meaningful
work. Next, I show in Part III how American jurisprudence has been
devoted to developing one of these features-a style of legal judgment
that unites generality and particularity-along precisely the lines that
the "meaningful work" tradition suggested. In Part IV, I note some of
the ways in which the leaders of the profession have rationalized the
emasculation of this style of judgment in the field of legal ethics. Finally, Part V acknowledges that there is a frightening, as well as exhilarating, side to the ideal of meaningful work that may account for the
profession's inconstant embrace of it.
This Essay is a more indirect critique of the Dominant View than
most. It does not set out so much to refute the Dominant regime of cate-

3. My argument is set out at length in WiLLLm H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A
THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHIcs (forthcoming 1998). See also DAvID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 322-35 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice,37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 592 (1984-1985); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1083 (1988); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1703 (1993).
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gorical norms as to make it appear both an anomaly and an obstacle to
the deepest ambitions that animate legal professionalism.
I. THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION
Alienation is a diagnosis in most critical portrayals of modernity.
The symptoms are a sense of one's own weightlessness and ineffectuality and of the strangeness and impermeability of the social world.
In modem social theory, alienation emerges as a problem of the
transition from organically integrated societies to looser, more individualistic ones. For some, the history of the West over the past five
centuries or so is simply one long transition of this kind. Others see
more partial and intense versions of the transition occurring in various
discrete periods. For example, Robert Wiebe portrayed America at the
time of the emergence of the institutions of modem professionalism in
the late nineteenth century as such a transition:
Yet to almost all of the people who created them, these themes
meant only dislocation and bewilderment. America in the late nineteenth century was a society without a core. It lacked those national
centers of authority and information which might have given order to
such swift changes. American institutions were still oriented toward a
community life where family and church, education and press, professions and government, all largely found their meaning by the way they
fit one with another inside a town or a detached portion of a city. As
men ranged farther and farther from their communities, they tried desperately to understand the larger world in terms of their small, familiar
environment. They tried, in other words, to impose the known upon
the unknown, to master an impersonal world through the customs of a
personal society.4
This picture stands in opposition to the classical liberal portrayal of
modernity as the happy triumph of individualism. In that portrayal, the
erosion of relatively fixed roles and institutions and relatively selfcontained communities is a boon that makes possible both prosperity
and individual self-realization. The theorists of alienation find this view
naive in two general respects. From the point of view of social welfare,
the decline of traditional social institutions creates a host of problems
that cannot be solved through independent individual action, but require
the collective creation of a new set of stable institutions. From the point
of view of the individual, the new society leaves the social dimension of

4. ROBERTH. ,VIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER:

1877-1920, at 12 (1967).
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self unsatisfied; it fails to provide the senses of place and connection
that are essential aspects of self-realization.
It is the latter point of view that most concerns us. Its premise is
that people need a sense of both relation to the larger society and solidarity with concrete others, not just family and friends, but a wider circle of potential collaborators in material and political projects. At the
same time, this view often concedes that people have a need to express
their individuality and impress their wills on their surroundings.
For many, the satisfaction of these potentially conflicting needs for
connection and self-assertion lay in the idea of meaningful work. Work
is "meaningful" when the worker experiences it as both a form of a selfassertion and a point of connection and solidarity with the larger society. The most common reference point for the theorists of alienation has
been the artisan, especially under the regime of the early modem guild.
The artisan has a sense of place in society as the producer of an
important product. His skills and a variety of cooperative practices in
the production process provide the basis for a shared occupational
community among members of the craft. At the same time, craft production involves individual self-expression in two senses. First, the artisan, individually or with a small number of collaborators, controls the
work process, deciding when, what, how much, and how to produce.
Second, the artisan's products are not standardized, but involve myriad
variations and are often customized for the particular purchaser. The artisan's techniques take the form of general principles and generalpurpose tools that can be adapted to an infinite variety of specialized
uses. Thus, the artisan's work leaves room for, and often demands,
creativity.
Although nostalgia for the guild regime is common among alienation theorists, many acknowledge that even at its best the opportunities
for self-expression the regime provided were highly limited and that
they were often accompanied by heavy social costs in terms of monopolistic practices and technological stagnation. For most of them,
traditional craft production is not an institutional ideal, so much as a set
of clues about the possibilities of meaningful work. They do not prescribe a return to the guilds, but the adoption of some of their animating
principles.5
In their paradigmatic, unreformed states, the core institutions of
modernity-the market and the bureaucracy-appear as threats to
meaningful work. The alienation theorists emphasize the similarities of
5.

See, e.g., G.D.H. COLE, GUILD SOCALuSM RESTATED (Transaction Books 1980) (1920).
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these two institutions: both are premised on specialization of function,
involve potentially large scale coordination, and above all, typically
regulate through impersonal rule. In both the two most influential alienation theories-the Marxist/Romantic critique of the market and the
Weberian/Romantic critique of bureaucracy--each institution appears
in part as a variation on the principle of governance through impersonal
rule.
The Marxist perspective portrays the worker in the capitalist labor
market as
a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system. He finds it
already pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of
him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not....
[Under these laws] all issues are subjected to an increasingly formal and standardised treatment and in which there is an everincreasing remoteness from the qualitative and material essence of the
"things" [that are the subjects of decision].6
For Weber, the "specific nature" of bureaucracy develops more
perfectly the more the bureaucracy is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred,
and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape
calculation.7 The paradigmatic way in which bureaucracy accomplishes
this is by mandating "'rational' interpretation of law on the basis of
strictly formal conceptions." 8
The psychological consequence is that the worker (or official) does
not experience work as personal expression or as meaningful social participation. The Weberian perspective emphasizes the first loss; the web
of rules becomes an "iron cage" that restrains the exercise of will. 9 The
Marxist perspective emphasizes the second; the rules obscure the social
meaning of the worker's activity. They blind her to the ways in which
the particular acts she and her fellows engage in contribute to the larger
social ordering. The functions of social ordering take place behind the
backs of the workers, so that they seem to operate independently of hu-

6. Georg LukAcs, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,in HISTORY AND
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALEcTICS 83, 98-99 (Rodney Livingstone trans.,
Merlin Press 1971) (1968).
7. See MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy,in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946).
8. Id. at 216.
9. See iii at 196-244.
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man action. ° Such a process of coordination resembles the "invisible
hand" that earlier political economists had described in benign terms."
The later theorists saw overwhelming psychological costs.
One is isolation. By subordinating individuals directly to the norms
and rigidly specifying their conduct, the regime of impersonal rule
eliminates needs and opportunities for collaboration. Another cost is ineffectuality. The new system induces a stultifyingly passive, or
"contemplative," posture toward the larger patterns of social life. It denies the worker the Promethean satisfaction of leaving some lasting impression of himself on the world; the new worker has no opportunity for
creativity. The craftsman had the experience of directly producing some
useful product. The new worker has only the most limited sense of how
her regimented, specialized activity contributes to some final product, or
perhaps, even of the usefulness of the final product.
Finally and most importantly for our purposes, there is the loss of
moral agency. The new worker lacks the autonomy or the understanding, or both, required for ethical responsibility. Whatever moral understanding the worker has must be subordinated to the unbending commands of the rules. And perhaps most distressingly, the worker may not
develop moral understanding because she lacks motivation or ability to
understand how her conduct relates to larger goods and evils.
This loss of moral agency is the most salient quality in modem literary portrayals of lawyers. One memorable symbol of this is the habit
of Jaggers in Great Expectations of constantly washing his hands, so
that one of the first things we notice about him is the smell of scented
soap. 2 It's easy to see why the lawyer is such a fascinating figure in
considerations of the moral dimension of alienation. On the one hand,
the lawyer seems distinctively powerful in a system of impersonal rules;
rule mastery is her specialty. On the other hand, she is at the same time
distinctively vehement in disclaiming responsibility for the consequences of her actions. This disparity between power and responsibility
drives Mr. Gridley in Bleak House into a frenzied harangue that concludes:
"I mustn't go to Mr. Tulkinghorn, the solicitor in Lincoln's Inn Fields,
and say to him when he makes me furious, by being so cool and satisfied-as they all do; for I know they gain by it while I lose, don't I-I

10. See Lukdcs, supra note 6, at 92-103.
11. See ADAM SMrrIH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1976) (1904).
12. See CHARLES DicKENs, GREATEXPECrATONS 129, 199 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (1907).
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mustn't say to him, I will have something out of some one for my ruin,
by fair means or foul! He is not responsible. It's the system. But, if I
do no violence to any of them, here-I may! I don't know what may
happen if I am carried beyond myself at last!-I will accuse the individual workers of that system against me, face to face, before the great
'
eternal bar!"13
Another dimension of the loss of agency is the lawyer's insensitivity to the underlying moral stakes of his work. Dostoevsky's lawyers,
who are usually government officials, exercise considerably more
agency than Dickens's, but they are blind to the values implicit in the
rules they enforce. Dimitri Karamazov and Raskolnikov each has exactly the same complaint about the magistrate who interrogates him: he
will not go to the heart of the matter. Both magistrates are preoccupied
with procedural formalities or circumstantial evidentiary matters and
seem indifferent to protagonist's first-person testimony about the core
issues.' 4 Dickens portrayed this tendency comically in his portrait
of the
s
bureaucrats of the Circumlocution Office in Little Dorritti
Perhaps the most powerful portrayal of moral alienation under regime of categorical rule is Kafka's The Trial, especially in the Parable
of the doorkeeper, which Joseph K. hears in the Cathedral. This occurs
toward the conclusion of his nightmarish experiences while trying to
clear his name of the unspecified charges that triggered an official proceeding against him. Although we sometimes think of the novel as a
portrayal of totalitarianism or bureaucracy, it is quite explicitly an account of life under a certain type of law. Kafka tells us at the beginning
that, "K. lived in a country with a legal constitution, there was universal

13. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 164 (Morton Dauwen Zabel ed., The Riverside Press
1956) (1853).
14. See FYODOR DosToEvsKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 387 (Modem Library 1994)
(1866); FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAmszov 291-332 (Princess Alexandra Kropotkin trans., International Collectors Library 1949) (1880). Julian Sorel also makes this complaint. See STENDHAL (MARIE HE NRBEYLE), THE RED AND THE BLACK 564, 574 (C.K. Scott
Moncrieff trans., Modem Library 1995) (1926).
In addition to the horrors of subordination to impersonal rules, Dickens, Dostoevsky,
Stendhal, and Kafka (whom we discuss momentarily), in strikingly similar ways, portray the horrors of subordination to personal whim and unprincipled manipulation as well. All suggest that the
two kinds of experience go together. It is tempting to suggest that the idea of contextual or purposive judgment-judgment that is principled but informal-is the remedy to the pathologies they
portray. It is hard to say whether the authors would be sympathetic to this response. Jurisprudence
is a very small part of the complex of sentiments, ideas, and institutions with which they were
concerned.
15. See CHARLES DICKENS, LrrrLE DoRRrrT 145-65 (John Holloway ed., Penguin Books

1967) (1857).
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peace, all laws were in force .... ,, 6
When the warders come to arrest K., they tell him they do not
know why they are required to do this, but suggest that their boss, the
inspector, whom they portray as a formidable person, will explain
things. But the inspector turns out to be equally ignorant. This sequence,
in which people we expect to be powerful and intimidating turn out to
be confused and silly, recurs. The sense of menace that we start to associate with individual characters recedes repeatedly into a social background that no one seems to have any control over.
In Kafka's work, people constantly refer to the governing rules either as "Law," "duty," or "authority," the latter typically defining the
boundaries of official roles. We are repeatedly told that people exceed
their authority, or that they try to circumvent the rules by using personal
influence to get favors. But the author and the characters also often explain behavior as complying with the rules, and this behavior is invariably meaningless to both K. and the actors themselves, except as a
requirement of a rule. The recurring discovery that the behavior is as
meaningless to the actors as to K. intensifies the sense of shallowness
and silliness of the characters and the sense of menace of the social
background.
These themes are crystallized in the "doorkeeper" chapter. K. hears
the Parable from a priest whom he encounters in the cathedral. He has
gone to the cathedral for the purpose of showing it to a client of the
bank, but the client never arrives. He notices the priest mounting the
pulpit and, deeming it "absurd" for the priest to preach a sermon to an
all but empty church, wonders "if it were this priest's duty to preach a
sermon at a certain hour regardless of circumstances."' 7 It turns out,
however, that the priest's appearance has a point; he has come to talk to
K., to offer him a parable that will illuminate his experience with the
Law.
In crude summary, the Parable of the doorkeeper tells the story of a
man seeking "the Law" who arrives at an open door apparently leading
to "the Law" and finds it guarded by the doorkeeper, who tells him that
he cannot admit the man "at this moment."' 8 We soon learn that the
doorkeeper is the lowliest of a series of many guards before the many
doors that must be opened before reaching the Law. The man waits before the initial door for years, cajoling, importuning, and trying to bribe

16. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 7 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1970) (1937).
17. Id. at 261.
18. 111 at 267.
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the doorkeeper, to no avail. Eventually the man grows sick and weak,
and on the verge of death he puts a final question to the doorkeeper,
Why during all these years has no one else come here seeking admittance to the Law? The doorkeeper replies, "'No one but you could gain
admittance through this door, since this door was intended for you. I am
now going to shut it."" 9
There follows a parody of legal and religious textual exegesis in
which K. and the priest discuss the meaning of the Parable. The discussion focuses on the character of the doorkeeper. K. begins by condemning him for contributing to an injustice. But the priest replies that it is
possible that the doorkeeper was simply following the rules, or as he
puts it, "'fulfill[ing] his duty."'2 Perhaps, he implies, the man could
only be admitted at a particular time. Perhaps when the time came, he
failed to take the required actions to perfect his rights to enter. This may
have been because the man was unaware of the requirements, but it may
not have been the doorkeeper's duty to inform him.
The priest then suggests different ways of appraising the doorkeeper's performance.'
One, which might be called Romantic/Weberian, suggests that the doorkeeper sympathized with the man
and his quest for the Law but was constrained by the rules from doing
more than he did to help him. Another, which might be called Romantic/Marxist, suggests that the doorkeeper had no understanding of his
circumstances, that he is in fact "more deluded" than the man. He is,
after all, the lowliest of the many doorkeepers. It is unlikely he himself
has seen the Law. While the man can at least see the light shining out
the door, the doorkeeper has his back to it. Moreover, the priest reminds
Joseph K. that, whatever we may think of his service to the man after
his arrival, "'for many years, for as long as it takes a man to grow up to
the prime of life, his service was in a sense an empty formality, since he
had to wait for a man to come."'
Toward the end of the discussion, the priest advances a new interpretation that sees the doorkeeper as not at all "deluded," but indeed
exalted by virtue of his attachment to the Law: "'It is the Law that has'
placed him at his post; to doubt his dignity is to doubt the Law itself."'
The discussion then concludes:

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
See id. at 270-78.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 276.
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"I don't agree with that point of view," said K., shaking his head, "for
if one accepts it, one must accept as true everything the doorkeeper
says. But you yourself have sufficiently proved how impossible it is to
do that." "No," said the priest, "it is not necessary to accept everything
as true, one must only accept it as necessary." "A melancholy
conclu24
sion," said K. "It turns lying into a universal principle."
This seems to satirize Positivism, but perhaps also more generally,
all arguments that assert that conduct, which in the here-and-now is alienating (or unjust), is necessary to some more remote, abstract end
(order, efficiency, justice in the long run). We might generalize the
priest's remark that it is not necessary to accept everything as true to
suggest that the immediate values of truth and justice must yield to the
more abstract imperatives of order. And we might interpret K.'s response that the priest's appeal to necessity requires an embrace of dishonesty (which on a literalistic interpretation is a non-sequitur, since the
priest has just disclaimed an effort to induce belief in truth) as a claim
that the necessitarian justifications for the doorkeeper's conduct are either unconvincing or insufficient to alleviate the sense of strangeness
and terror the novel associates with governance by categorical rule.
We often think of The Trial from the point of view of the oppressed citizen represented by Joseph K. However, most of the characters in the novel are identified and described in terms of their work as
insiders of various kinds in the system (and part of the novel portrays K.
himself as a worker in a bank).2 More often than not, we see them as
grotesque and pathetic. This impression is in part due to the opacity of
their practices, their disconnection from larger social purposes, which
the novel links in turn to the categorical nature of the norms that govern
them.
This indictment of role is different from complaints about the specialization and conformity roles require. Some currents of the alienation
critique object that roles narrow the range of capacities an individual
can express and develop, and that they presuppose a large measure of
acceptance of the surrounding society. But the version of the alienation
critique that invokes the artisanal ideal does not press such objections; it
accepts both the finitude of human potential and the claims of social acquiescence, both saliently embodied in the artisanal role. Its complaint
focuses instead on the experience of the individual of alienation from
the very values that undergird her own role. And this experience arises
24. Id.
25. See id. at 103-12.
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from the denial to the worker of the discretion to shape her work in accordance with these values.
The Trial evokes this alienation when, for example, it imagines the
priest obliged to preach a sermon even if the cathedral is empty or the
doorkeeper obliged to guard the door even if no one is likely to come. It
evokes it most stunningly in the doorkeeper's next-to-last words--"this
door was intended for you." 6 The effect of this declaration is to make
the doorkeeper's practices, which already seem grotesque, seem even
more so by suggesting that they are inconsistent with their very purposes.
It is worth contrasting the alienation critique to the more familiar
critique of role morality in works such as Herman Melville's Billy
Budd27 and Jean Anouilh's Antigone.2 Each of these works involves a
character-Captain Vere, Creon-who occupies a political role that
commits him to the defense of order. Each revolves around a situation
in which order appears to require the sacrifice of a morally admirable
person-Billy Budd, Antigone-for actions that are justifiable or at
least excusable but that, if left unpunished, will incite disorder.
Each work begins with a sympathetic portrayal of the subversive
hero and his or her crime. Each then shifts perspective to that of the
political officeholder. The authors proceed to surprise and discomfort us
by inducing at least provisional sympathy with Captain Vere and Creon.
Each man does an apparently necessary job, and the authors spend great
artistry to make us sense how, from within the perspective of their roles,
the sacrifice of Billy Budd and Antigone seems necessary.
Then, a second shift of perspective occurs. We pull back from the
identification with the political role and begin to doubt its necessity and
moral attractiveness. The doubt goes less to the assumption that the
sacrifice of the innocent hero is necessary to the preservation of the
political order than to the assumption that the preservation of the political order is worthwhile. Neither work resolves these doubts explicitly.
Anouilh's play, which was written and first performed during the Nazi
occupation of Paris, is usually interpreted to suggest that preoccupation
with the internal morality of role can blind us to the evil of the larger
structure that the role serves. Creon thus exemplifies Hannah Arendt's
"banality of evil."2'9
26. Id. at 269.
27. See HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD (Penguin Books 1967) (1962).
28. See JEAN ANOUILH, ANTIGONE (Random House 1946).
29. HANNAH ARENDT, EIcHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963).
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Melville's work is more ambiguous. It flirts with-and never rejects-an interpretation that would accept both Vere's understanding of
the demands of his role and the necessity of the larger order it serves. In
this view, there is a tragic dignity to Vere's (and Creon's) position. All
political decisions involve moral costs; thus, one who assumes political
responsibility must be willing to sacrifice some of the innocent for the
sake of order. The job is psychologically difficult, but we should be
sympathetic with and grateful to those who can do it effectively.
Notice that both interpretations-the "banality of evil" interpretation and the "tragic choice" interpretation-are quite different from the
alienation critique exemplified by the Parable of the doorkeeper. Both
interpretations of Billy Budd and Antigone assume a decision-maker
acting in harmony with the logic of his role and a decision that directly
incarnates the role's fundamental purpose. To put it somewhat differently, in both cases, if the legislator who enacted the rules under which
the official operates were himself making the decision, he would have
made exactly the same decision Captain Vere or Creon made. In both
cases, the reservations about the decision arise from values outside the
role, and the question we are pressed to consider is whether the role and
the system it helps constitute are legitimate.
But the doorkeeper story and the Marxian and Weberian critiques
of alienation present a different image. While Vere and Creon have intuitive access to the norms that govern their roles, the doorkeeper cannot see the Law. His stunning final line emphasizes that he has not acted
in harmony with any role logic. Either the purposes of the role escape
his understanding or he is not trusted to implement them directly. The
surprise and irony of the last line arises from the suggestion that, if the
legislator were there to make the decision directly, he would decide differently. There is no hint of dignity, nor even of banality in the doorkeeper. The doorkeeper is, on any of the interpretations Kafka evokes,
simply grotesque. Thus, Kafka has given an image of the distinctive
degradation associated, not with role in general, but with role defined by
categorical norms, and he suggests that this degradation is an exceptionally corrosive one.
Of course, I don't suggest that, even if my interpretation of The
Trial is right, the Dominant View is refuted simply because Kafka rejected it. (There may be novels that portray conformity to categorically
defined role as fulfilling, though I can't think of any great ones.)" But if

30. For example, there is Herman Wouk's The Caine Mutiny, which is sometimes interpreted
to assert that, even though Captain Queeg was an incompetent and abusive commander, his sub-
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right, the interpretation usefully links one of the most resonant and
compelling portrayals of contemporary alienation with an important
premise of the Dominant View. Thus, it offers a clue to what might lie
behind the vaguer expressions of alienation in the recent anguished literature of lawyering, and it makes available a vivid image to support the
intuition that there is something stultifying about the role prescribed by
the Dominant View.
II.

THE PROFESSIONAL SOLUTION

One response to the alienation critique was to deny the need for
meaningful work. Sinclair Lewis produced a memorable image of this
approach in Dr. Roscoe Geake, a character in Arrowsmith, who finds his
calling upon leaving a medical professorship for the presidency of the
New Idea Medical Instrument and Furniture Company. His farewell
advice to his students emphasizes the importance of attractive office
furniture on the doctor's ability to inspire the confidence necessary for
"putting over and collecting an adequate fee."3' He concludes:
For don't forget, gentlemen, and this is my last message to you, the
man worth while... instead of day-dreaming and spending all his time
talking about "ethics," splendid though they are, and "charity," glorious virtue though that be, yet he never forgets that unfortunately the
world judges a man by the amount of good hard cash he can lay
32
away.
Another approach was to make a virtue of what the Marxists disparaged as the disengaged, "contemplative" aspect of alienated work.
No parody could develop this position to a greater extreme than Holmes
did on two occasions when he spoke to law students. He conceded the
ordinates should not have mutinied against him. See HERMAN WouK, THE CAINE MTrINY 440-48

(1951). The message is delivered with drama and irony by the chief mutineer's defense lawyer
Barney Greenwald, who explains to his client that, even though he (Greenwald) believed that the
mutineers had acted wrongly in refusing Queeg the deference his role demanded, Greenwald's
own role as defense lawyer required him to humiliate Queeg and exonerate the mutineer. See id.;
W
,V4LuI

H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 243-48 (1956). Note that Whyte, who popular-

ized this interpretation of the novel as an endorsement of Greenwald's view, condemned what he
took to be its conformist message.
In general, novelists seem to have opposed the notion of categorically defined role with
fairly consistent vigor. Even the three biggest law-and-order men of nineteenth-century fiction-

Fyodor Dostoevsky, Joseph Conrad, and Henry James-show nothing but distaste for the idea.
Consider Porfiry in Crime and Punishment,the Board of Inquiry in Lord Jim, and the heroine of
James's story In the Cage.

31. SiNctLALswis, ARRowsrIrH 89 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1945) (1925).
32. Id. at 88.
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stultifying character of law practice, asking, "How can the laborious
study of a dry and technical system, the greedy watch for clients and
practice of shopkeepers' arts, the mannerless conflicts over often sordid
interests, make out a life?"33 His recommendation was that they cultivate
the "secret isolated joy of the thinker" 4 by burying themselves
(presumably in their spare time) in study of the "remoter and more general aspects of the law. 35 "The law is the calling of thinkers, 36 Holmes
continued. Though practice mires them in particularity, leisure study
time permits them to express their disposition to "make plainer the way
from some thing to the whole of things." 37
Others, however, produced a more ambitious response to the alienation critique. They conceded the horrors of alienated work engendered by the market and the bureaucracy. Yet they suggested that the
conditions of modem society permitted, indeed required, a different
form of productive organization more hospitable to meaningful work.
This was the profession. The designers and theorists of the modem profession, often in self-conscious reaction to the alienation theorists, suggested that professionalism might produce a kind of work that would be
experienced as both self-expression and compliance with social norms.
They argued that professionalism could, and should, be institutionalized
in ways that differed from paradigmatic markets and bureaucracies, especially in their repudiation of governance by categorical rule.
One of the earliest expressions of this view, and still one of the
most powerful, is George Eliot's Middlemarch, published in 1871 and
1872, just after the establishment in America of the landmark institution
of legal professionalism-the American Bar Association.
Middlemarch has been aptly called a "novel of vocation," as most
of its many characters are portrayed in substantial part in relation to
their work. The gallery includes a few characters like Lewis's Dr. Geake
who seek nothing from work but material self-advancement, notably the
grocer Mawmsey, who replies to a candidate's suggestion that he exercise his newly won vote in a "public spirit,": "'When I give a vote... I
must look to what will be the effects on my till and ledger .... ,'38 As

33. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
29,29 (1920).
34. Id. at 32.
35. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 33, at 167, 202.
36. HOLMES, supra note 33, at 29-30.
37. Id. at 30.
38. GEORGE ELIOT, MDDLEMARCH 544 (Penguin Books 1965) (1871-1872).

19971

MEANINGFUL WORK

Lewis did with Dr. Geake, Eliot portrays Mawmsey as shallow and
foolish.
However, she reserves her most intense scorn for those who follow
Holmes's advice and seek the isolated glory of contemplative abstraction. There is, for example, the preacher Mr. Tyke, who is preoccupied
with doctrinal niceties and indifferent to the concrete problems of the
parishioners; he is compared unfavorably to Mr. Farebrother, "'a parson
among parishioners whose lives he has to try and make better."' 39 And
above all, there is the grotesque Casaubon who, at the expense of everyone around him, has devoted his life to researching a monumental study
synthesizing all mythological thought-a work Eliot portrays as arid
and vacuous, a project of vanity and self-delusion.
Eliot shows sympathy for two different vocational paths. One is
that of Caleb Garth, the only happy male character in the book. Garth is
a self-employed builder and part-time manager who has the skills and
values of the artisan. "[B]y 'business,' Caleb never meant money transactions, but the skilful application of labour."4 Work for him is a source
of pride and fellowship. But the novel entertains diffidently the prediction made so vehemently by Marx that the opportunities for the artisanal
career may be shrinking. Larger-scale and more impersonal forms of
economic organization, represented in the novel by the coming railroad
and the banker Buistrode, appear as potential threats to the skills and
autonomy of the craft worker.
The vocational aspirations that most fascinate Eliot are those of Dr.
Lydgate, who wants to apply new scientific developments in medicine
to the care of patients. From the point of view of the novel's sociological themes, Lydgate is an exciting figure because he is simultaneously
at the vanguard of modernizing social developments and yet, like Garth
and Farebrother, committed to personal service to concrete individuals.
Again and again, Eliot emphasizes the distinctive combination of the
general and abstract on the one hand and the particular and personal on
the other in Lydgate's vocation.
[Hie carred to his studies... the conviction that the medical profession as it might be was the finest in the world; presenting the most perfect interchange between science and art; offering the most direct alliance between intellectual conquest and social good. Lydgate's nature
demanded this combination: he was an emotional creature, with a
flesh-and-blood sense of fellowship which withstood all the abstrac-

39. Id. at 537.
40. Id. at 596.
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tions of special study. He cared not only for "cases," but for John and
Elizabeth .... 41
Lydgate's youthful efforts depicted in the novel are tragically unsuccessful, and the book is ambiguous about the moral quality of his
success after he moves to London. Yet Lydgate seems to represent some
of the author's deepest aspirations.
In the years since Middlemarch appeared, these aspirations have
been expressed over and over by both prominent professionals and academics out to refute the alienation theorists. In America, they were at
the core of the views of the Progressive movement in politics and the
Functionalist movement in academic sociology. Perhaps their best
known proponents were the Progressive lawyer Louis Brandeis and the
Functionalist sociologist Talcott Parsons. In mutual ignorance but
strikingly convergent terms, Brandeis and Parsons (and following them,
myriad allies and disciples) elaborated a view of modernization that put
professions at the center.42
In crude summary, the theory was this: Marx and Weber had based
their visions of inexorable marketization and bureaucratization on industrial production and military and welfare state organizations. The
premise of governance under categorical rule may have been plausible
in these instances because such organizations tend to produce standardized products and routinized services. (Later writers would severely
question this concession.)
But a central and growing sector of modem economies is concemed with the provision of services that are at once technical and particularistic. These are the professions, as typified by law, medicine, and
engineering; soon to be augmented by a host of newer service groups
such as nursing and social work; and augmented further-so both Brandeis and Parsons argued-by the transformation of business management into a professional activity. Because such services depend upon
technical knowledge and resist standardization, they are not readily
compatible with market or bureaucratic organization. In the market, the
customer would have to shop for services tailored to her needs, but
without specialized training, would be unable to evaluate effectively
what she got. In the bureaucracy, performance could not be specified
categorically.

41. Id. at 174.
42. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, BusINEss-A PROFESSION (Hale, Cushman & Flint 1933)
(1914); TALCOTr PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SoCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370 (rev. ed. 1954).
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So this type of work has to be organized differently. At the level of
practice, workers have to be given autonomy and responsibility. At the
level of occupational regulation, collective self-governance is needed.
The system might work in the absence of the material incentives of the
market and the bureaucracy because professional work organized in this
manner provides satisfactions to practitioners that motivate responsibility. These were precisely the psychological satisfactions that the alienation theorists despaired of achieving in the emerging social order.
Told in this manner, the story explained professionalism as a solution to a technical problem of organizing a certain kind of work. But
while they didn't put the moral point in the forefront, the ProgressiveFunctionalist view at least implicitly shared Eliot's aspiration that professionalism would be the answer to the problem of meaningful work.
Although they often spoke of this feature of professionalism as a byproduct of a technological development, they exulted in it.
Here, for example, is the historian Robert Wiebe again on turn-ofthe-century America:
As this society [of small towns and urban neighborhoods] crumbled,
the specialized needs of an urban-industrial system came as a godsend
to a middle stratum in the cities. Identification by way of their skills
gave them the deference of their neighbors while opening natural avenues into the nation at large. Increasingly formal entry requirements
into their occupations protected their prestige through exclusiveness.
The shared mysteries of a specialty allowed intimate communion even
at long range, as letters among the scattered champions of public
health demonstrated. Finally, the ability to see how their talents
meshed with others in a national scheme encouraged them to look
outward confidently instead of furtively. 43
Here are precisely the elements of meaningful work.
"Identification by way of skills" and "shared mysteries" provide a basis
for cooperative relationships that overcome isolation. "Specialized
needs" requiring individualized service means that the practitioner will
have a sense of control over her work and of creativity in adapting her
general knowledge to the particular circumstances of the client. And the
ability to place one's skills in a transparent "national scheme" means
that the practitioner will have a sense of how her acts relate to larger
social purposes.
The professional's moral agency is secured at two levels. On the
level of the profession as a whole, the members participate in defining
43. WMBE, supra note 4, at 113.
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the broader social needs it serves and the occupational norms that implement these needs. On the level of individual practice, the essence of
the professional's work is the adaptation of these general norms to the
particular circumstances of the client.
Of course, these arrangements would vindicate the ideal of meaningful work only to the extent the professional's own values converged
with the governing norms. The Progressive-Functionalist View was
confident that they would. In part this was because its proponents found
professional norms, as they were actually evolving, both appealing and
well-adapted to the surrounding institutions of modem society, and they
assumed that other reasonable people would appreciate these virtues.
But they supplemented this aspiration with two further ideas.
One was the notion, amply illustrated in Middlemarch, that criticism and "reform" were integral elements of professional work. Professional work is a continuous process of self-reconstitution, and this creates legitimate and productive roles for dissidence, such as Lydgate's.
The second was the notion of "secondary socialization," which suggested that the professions might design processes of initiation, such as
prolonged schooling or apprenticeship, through which individuals
would be induced unconsciously to accept the governing norms as if
they were there own. This latter notion sits less comfortably with the
ideal of meaningful work, but was occasionally useful in explaining
how the professional project might be viable in a society with extensive
normative dissensus.
American lawyers developed the Progressive-Functionalist View in
two broad respects. First, they developed an institutional model of selfgovernance. The model provides for collective control by incumbent
practitioners over the admission of newcomers and over a disciplinary
process that enforces norms of good practice. The norms are primarily
concerned with the adequacy of service to clients, and secondarily with
fairness to third parties. For many years, they also attempted to structure
the market for legal services to give some insulation from competitive
pressures by inhibiting price cutting, advertising, and solicitation. This
latter effort would have been of interest to Eliot, who doubted that the
professional project was compatible with the funding of services
through the market. Indeed, Lydgate comes to grief in part because of
such competitive pressures.
The project of self-regulation suffered substantial setbacks in recent years. The effort at economic control has been largely abandoned.
The admissions process has been streamlined and loosened. Although
disciplinary activity increased, its relative importance declined with the
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growth of extra-professional lawyer regulation through the malpractice
system, court and legislature-imposed litigation rules, and the activity of
specialized agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Office of Thrift Supervision. My own view is that the relative
decline of these particular self-regulatory institutions is desirable and
does not threaten the important aspects of the professional project.
The second, and more important, development was the elaboration
of a conception of legal judgment that explained how legal work could
be both abstract and particular, self-expression and social control, and
creative yet grounded in established norms. This effort, which embraces
the work of Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo early in the century,
of Karl Llewellyn and Henry Hart later on, and Ronald Dworkin most
recently, constitutes the major preoccupation and enduring achievement
of American academic lawyers.
This is not the place to try to do justice to the richness and variety
of this work. For present purposes, it is enough to say that a crude but
accurate summary of all of it would be this: Abstraction and particularity, self-expression and social control, and creativity yet groundedness
are all qualities of good contextual judgment, and contextual judgment
is the defining activity of legal work in America. Contextual standards
are general norms that depend upon, and are typically derived from, the
circumstances of particular applications. Since new and unique cases
constantly arise, the answers involve creativity; yet when plausible, they
seem to have been implicit in the pre-existing norms. To the extent that
lawyer shares the relevant public norms, she expresses her own values
as she vindicates the public ones.
This jurisprudence is commonly understood to be concerned with
legitimating the role of the activist judiciary in a democratic society.
That is surely a prominent preoccupation. But it seems likely that another important concern is to demonstrate the possibility that law could
manifest the virtues of meaningful work. Indeed, whatever the intentions of their authors, the classics of American jurisprudence represent
the most extended illustration in all social theory of the ideal of meaningful work.

III. THE LOST LAWYER
We now have to deal with the question of the "lost lawyer," not in
Anthony Kronman's sense of the disorientedlawyer,4 but in the sense

44. See ANTHONYT. KRONMAN, THE LosTLAWYER 353-54 (1993).
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of the missing lawyer, the lawyer who appears so little in American
theorizing about law, including Kronman's.
For it is a striking fact about this literature that the legal work it
explicates so exultantly is for the most part identified with the judge.
Most of the literature has been produced by academics with tenuous
connections to practice and whose interests and ambitions focus on
judging. When these theorists have left the academy, they have usually
done so to become judges. Kronman's preoccupation with the "lawyer
statesman," who occupies positions in the executive branch, reminds us
that the theorists' preoccupations occasionally ranged more broadly, but
this ideal is equally indifferent to the world of private practice, where
the vast majority of American lawyers always worked.45
I've been arguing that the ideas developed in the mainstream of
American legal theory imply a powerful criticism of the Dominant View
of legal ethics and an alternative vision based on contextual judgment
and the ideal of meaningful work. Yet it is a striking fact that most of
the theorists did not themselves draw these implications explicitly or indeed confront the ethical issues of lawyering more than marginally.
There is, of course, an outstanding exception. Louis Brandeis is the
one great American legal theorist of the century to have made a major
mark in practice.' Although you would never know it from contemporary legal scholarship, which remains obsessed with the comparatively
ineffectual Holmes, Brandeis is probably this century's most influential
legal thinker. His early piece with Samuel Warren on the then emerging
"right to privacy" was a classic demonstration and defense of judicial
creativity in the common law.4 1 His work on banking, utility regulation,
and labor gave institutional concreteness to the ideas of the Progressive
movement." His defense of social legislation against constitutional
challenges in court, which produced the famous "Brandeis brief," pioneered the use of statistics and data in legal argument.49 His decisions on
the Supreme Court laid the intellectual foundations for the Legal Process school that produced the preeminent expression of liberal jurisprudence in the post-war era. And he was the foremost pre-war exponent of
the idea of professionalism as meaningful work.

45. See id. at 14-23.
46. Some might also put Thurman Arnold in this category, but his importance to both theory
and practice seems vastly less than Brandeis's.
47. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193

(1890).
48. See BRANDEIS, supra note 42, at 33-50, 99-114, 160-204.
49. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,419 & n.1 (1907).

1997]

MEANINGFUL WORK

In 1905 Brandeis spoke to a group of Harvard undergraduates.
"[Y]ou wish to know," he said, "whether the legal profession would af50
ford you special opportunities for usefulness to your fellow-men ....
Nineteen years earlier, Holmes, speaking to another group of Harvard
undergraduates, had speculated that his audience was asking a slightly
different question, "[W]hat have you said to show that I can reach my
own spiritual possibilities through such a door as this [that is, the life of
the lawyer]?"'" The beginning of Brandeis's answer was almost identical to Holmes's: The key feature of legal work, each man suggested, is
the constant cross-referencing of the general and particular. But from
this point, they took different directions. As we saw, Holmes viewed the
mundane particularities of practice as raw material for solitary, contemplative theorizing. On the other hand, for Brandeis, redemption lay
however general, "have reference
in the fact that the lawyer's efforts,
52
always to some practical end.
In the three decades before he became a judge, Brandeis was a
practicing lawyer. He took many high profile government assignments.
He largely crafted the modem idea of the public interest lawyer, who
represents nongovernmental clients pursuing reforms in accordance
with his conceptions of the public interest. And he was a highly successful private business lawyer. Brandeis wrote little about his private practice, and we lack detailed information about all but a few of his cases,
but we do know that in word and deed Brandeis repudiated aspects of
what he considered common features of the practice style of his day.53
First, Brandeis insisted that the aggressive lawyering of the Dominant View could not promote justice in situations where all interests
were not evenly represented, and he saw many such situations. His main
response to this problem was government and public interest work designed to level the playing field by providing representation to underorganized interests and curb the power of big business. He supported and
helped form various regulatory agencies and labor unions and consumer
groups. He developed the public interest lawyer role, purporting to
speak before legislatures, agencies, and courts on behalf of dispersed
and more or less unorganized citizens. He also argued for the idea that
counsel for powerful organizations had a duty to use their influence to

50. Louis D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESs-A PROFESSION, supra
note 42, at 329.
51. HOLMEs, supra note 33, at 29.
52. BRANDEIS, supra note 50, at 332.
53. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 245 (1946).
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discourage their clients from unjust or antisocial projects, and he practiced what he preached.'
Second, in situations involving parties of roughly equal power,
Brandeis urged lawyers to try to steer people away from wasteful
squabbling and to craft new frameworks of mutually beneficial collaboration. This required lawyers to go beyond the law and understand the
client's practical circumstances. It required a willingness to consider
sympathetically the interests of third parties with whom the client is involved. In one famous instance, Brandeis responded to a request from
the shoe manufacturer W.H. McElwain for assistance in negotiating a
wage cut with workers by pointing out that while McElwain's wage
rates were high, the average wages of his workers were low because
their employment was irregular. He insisted that the client study the
possibility of reorganizing his marketing and inventory practices with a
view toward regularizing output and labor demand. The effort was successful and made possible an arrangement that left both employer and
employees better off.'
Since such third parties always have potentially conflicting (as well
as potentially harmonious) interests, such efforts required a willingness
to subject the client to risks of nonreciprocity and betrayal. It also required the lawyer occasionally to put himself in opposition to clients or
former clients. Thus, Brandeis sometimes found himself accused of
disloyalty. Having represented both the United Shoe Machinery Company and its customers, the shoe manufacturers, for years, Brandeis
sided with the customers against the Machinery Company and (without
taking a fee) attacked arrangements he had helped craft when he decided the Company was abusing them.56 In the "Lennox" case, Brandeis,
consulted simultaneously by a troubled debtor and a major creditor, recommended an assignment of the debtor's property for the benefit of
creditors, and when they assented, arranged one with his partner as
trustee. When the partner found the debtor concealing assets, the firm

54. For example:
To one of his clients, faced at the time with labor trouble, Brandeis almost shouted:
"You say your factory cannot continue to pay the wages the employees now earn. But
you don't tell me what those earnings are. How much do they lose through irregularities in their work? You don't know? Do you undertake to manage this business and to
say what wages it can afford to pay while you are ignorant of facts such as these? Are
not these the very things you should know, and should have seen that your men knew
too, before you went into this fight?"
Id. at 144.
55. See id. at 145-46.
56. See id. at 214-29.
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to press vigorously for their disgorgement, to the debtor's
felt obliged
7
outrage.5
This latter point was the most radical aspect of Brandeis's approach to private practice. It led him to accept assignments involving
vaguely defined responsibilities to people with potentially conflicting
interests. Brandeis summarized his approach when he was asked whom
he thought he was representing in the Lennox case when he recommended the assignment. "I should say that I was counsel for the situation," he replied." This response was in radical tension with the spirit of
the mainstream bar's view of representation, which holds that the lawyer should normally assume responsibility only to a single set of unitary
interests, and Brandeis was accused quite plausibly of violating the
bar's conflict of interest rules on several occasions. These charges became a major part of the case against him at the time of his nomination
to the Supreme Court. 9
The bar's conflict of interest norms have never been as controversial as its client loyalty norms. The two sets of norms are strongly related, however, and Brandeis's lawyering style seemed radical because
it challenged both. The conflict of interest norms are premised on the
loyalty norms. It is because the lawyer is expected to be aggressively
loyal to a client that he cannot take on responsibilities to people with
differing interests. As John Frank put it, "Lawyers are not retained by
situations, and the adversary system assumes that they faithfully represent one interest at a time. '' 0
The conflict of interest prohibition reflects both the Positivism and
the Libertarianism that underpins the loyalty norms of the Dominant
View.6' Brandeis's "counsel to the situation" idea assumes that there are
tacit norms of fair dealing and collaboration to which the lawyer can resort to resolve competing interests among multiple clients. But the
Positivist theme questions the substantiality of such norms, and the Libertarian theme suggests it would be illegitimate for the lawyer to impose
them on clients. Together, these themes encourage the belief that the
only convincing indication of the legitimacy of a cooperative arrange57. See id. at 232-37 (discussing Brandeis's participation in the financial affairs of P. Lennox & Company and family).
58. Id. at 236.
59. See John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN L. REv. 683, 685
(1965). While Frank considers the specific charges without merit, he calls the "counsel for the
situation" remark "one of the most unfortunate phrases [Brandeis] ever casually uttered." Id. at
702.
60. lId
61. For an explanation of these themes, see SIMON, supra note 3.
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ment is that it was produced by an arm's length negotiation in which
every interest was independently represented.
The instrumental arguments for the Dominant View also underpin
the conflict of interest norms. If, as those arguments assert, adequate
preparation is precluded by duties to share information with adverse
parties, then joint representation of parties with adverse interests must
jeopardize adequate preparation. Joint representation also creates an impossible situation from the point of view of disclosure. The parties cannot tell whether their interests are sufficiently harmonious to permit
joint representation until they all make full disclosure to each other. Yet
once they have done so, they will have sacrificed an important advantage of separate representation.
Brandeis would not have denied that there were costs and risks in
the type of cooperation he urged. But there were also costs and risks to
separate representation, for example, the costs of duplication of effort,
of more circuitous communication, and of the failure to perceive opportunities for joint gains because of fragmentation of information and bias
of perspective. Functionally analyzed, the conflict of interest rules
rested on a dogmatic insistence that the risks and costs of collaboration
always outweigh the risks and costs of separate representation.
Brandeis's lawyering style thus, at least implicitly, posed a basic
challenge to the Dominant View. The radicalism of the challenge seems
to have been perceived by the bar's leaders at the time of his Supreme
Court nomination. Six former American Bar Association presidents asserted that Brandeis's departures from client loyalty and conflict of interest norms indicated him unfit for judicial office.62 Ironically, in losing
the nomination fight, the bar gained their antagonist's retirement from
the field of lawyering.
Brandeis never made his challenge explicit. In the post-World War
II period, however, there were only two major American legal theorists
to take an interest in practice that made some effort to draw out the
implications of Brandeis's vision. These were Henry Hart and James
Willard Hurst. It is surely no accident that both began their careers as
law clerks to Brandeis on the Supreme Court. The works of each are full
of references to Brandeis, and their understanding of practice was precisely the Brandeisian vision of meaningful work. They saw the potential of the insight that legal theory had developed in the judicial context-that law application could be both creative and grounded in
established norms-to ennoble the lawyering role. They argued and
62. See Frank,supra note 59, at 685.
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demonstrated that lawyers had creative power, and that this power entailed a responsibility to see that it was used consistently with the social
good.63
In situations of unequal power, the Brandeisians castigated lawyers
who allowed their clients to abuse their powers. They also advocated
judicial and regulatory solutions to remedy the imbalance of power or
impose socially desirable outcomes.
In situations of relatively equal power, they championed the
"counsel to the situation" approach in which the lawyer's job was to
craft frameworks of fair and mutually beneficial cooperation. For example, the third problem in the famous Legal Process materials Hart
wrote with Albert Sacks involves the drafting of a small-time commercial lease. The central problem is the appropriate allocation of the risks
and benefits of the lessee's business in a situation where the lessee
wants flexibility in the event his business has to struggle to get off the
ground and security of tenure in the event he is successful. The lessor
wants a minimum return, protection against inflation, and additional
return if the business is successful. The solution is a long-term arrangement with the rent based on a percentage of the lessee's sales, subject to
a periodically increasing fixed minimum. The authors introduce us to
the now-standard features of the percentage lease, emphasizing that the
device was not legislated by a Positivist sovereign but was in fact created by lawyers. And they urge that the lease should be negotiated and
interpreted in the light of the same interpretive premise they portray as
standard in the interpretation of statutes-that the norms were "designed
to operate rationally and evenhandedly." '
The Brandeisian vision of lawyering thus incarnates the virtues of
the nostalgic conception of the artisan's role in nineteenth-century alienation theory. Like the artisan, the lawyer applies general socially defined knowledge creatively to produce an individualized product. And
like him, the lawyer expresses a commitment to social norms and purposes by adhering to standards of quality in everyday practice. The fact
that the lawyer's role is freighted with a more explicit and complex
normative element makes it all the more promising as a vehicle for
linking concrete practical activity with encompassing values-the hallmark of "meaningful work" in the tradition we discussed above.
63. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-9 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (1958); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 249375 (1950).
64. HART & SACKS, supranote 63, at 207.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:445

The Brandeisian perspective has been an enduring voice in discussions of lawyering. It is reflected in parts of the modem ethics codes.
For example, the codes acknowledge the propriety of lawyer advice that
takes account of "moral" and "social" as well as strictly "legal" considerations.6 The conflict of interest restrictions have been substantially
loosened, and the Model Rules explicitly legitimate the role of the lawyer as intermediary."
IV. THE BRANDEISIAN EVASIONS
The Brandeisians never developed their perspective into a fullblown challenge to the Dominant View, and they never pressed their
criticisms with the activist vigor their mentor brought to so many other
causes. The more radical implications of the Brandeisian critique have
been largely neutralized, and this has occurred along two avenues that
Brandeis and his disciples themselves first marked.
The first is the idea that the Brandeisian perspective may be relevant to only certain realms of practice. The basic distinction inaugurated
by Brandeis was between litigation and counseling. Based on his own
experience, Brandeis, as well as Hurst and Hart, argued that counseling,
by which they meant providing nonlitigation advice and devising cooperative frameworks, was the exciting and important realm of practice.
They tended to ignore litigation, and by implication to concede that the
Dominant View might still be appropriate there.
The Brandeisians did not themselves put a lot of emphasis on this
distinction. It seems likely that they wrote off litigation for the same
reason other legal theorists wrote off private practice altogether-they
found it distasteful. More recently, many have proposed to adopt the
Brandeisian view but limit it to counseling, and indeed the codes pay lip
service to this idea, though for the most part they add only exhortation,
rather than enforceable duties, in the counseling sphere. 67 Typically the
distinction between the spheres is rationalized on the ground that, in
litigation, the parties are likely to be more or less equally represented
and supervised by the judge, whereas it is less likely that either safeguard will obtain in the counseling sphere.
This approach cannot survive reflection, and its vogue seems to be

65. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 3.3 & cmt., Rule 4.4 & cmt., Rule
6.1 & cnt. (1997).
66. See id. Rule 2.2.
67. See Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. Rnv. 577,
578 (1974-1975).
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coming to end. First, in the midst of the current sense of crisis over the
court system, it seems obvious that all the dysfunctions of litigation do
not arise from imbalances of power. Indeed some-the "arm's race"
features that compel one party to engage in expensive maneuvers solely
because the other has or will-are aggravated when both parties are
well-financed.
Second, the sectoral approach betrays the most basic tenet of modem jurisprudence-the repudiation, not of imbalances of power, but of
categorical judgment. It makes room for contextual judgment only at the
cost of introducing a new categorical distinction between litigation and
counseling. Even if it were generally true that the ethics of the Dominant View are well-suited to litigation, the sectoral approach would be
objectionable for failing to give the lawyer responsibility to modify
those ethics in the exceptional litigation situations where they are not
well-suited. The lawyer's responsibilities are critically determined by a
classic binary all-or-nothing decision that guarantees that the lawyer's
conduct will sometimes be inappropriate.
The depths of pettifogging mindlessness to which the approach can
lead were illustrated by the efforts of Geoffrey Hazard, a drafter of the
Model Rules, to defend the Kaye, Scholer lawyers in the aftermath of
the Lincoln Savings & Loan collapse. Hazard argued that the lawyers
were subject to a lower standard of responsibility to the public because
they were acting as litigators ("litigation counsel") than they would
have been if they were acting as counselors ("regulatory counsel"). Recalling that the lawyers were advising and assisting Lincoln in complying with Bank Board requests for auditing information, one might ask
what this has to do with litigation. Hazard's response was that, since the
government had begun to suspect Lincoln of illegal conduct, it was
likely to initiate litigation in the future!6"
Indeed, one might add, since the government's suspicions were
correct, litigation was more or less certain. Under Hazard's argument,
the more clearly lawless the client's conduct is, the stronger the case for
a lower standard of attorney-client responsibility. 6 Fortunately for the
68. See Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., in THE ATrORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFrER KAYE, SCHOLER 381, 394-97 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 779, 1992).
69. Even as an interpretation of the Model Rules, the argument was absurd. In addition to
mischaracterizing the lawyers as "litigation counsel," it mistakenly asserted that the standard applicable under that characterization would be that of Model Rule 3.1 which authorizes lawyers to
assert any claim on behalf of a client in litigation that is not frivolous. The argument was, apparently, that as long as Kaye, Scholer had a nonfrivolous argument that the information it held was
not called for and the assertions it made were not misleading, it was on safe ground. But the Rule

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:445

dignity of the bar, the argument was not widely accepted. Its absurd
implications are merely symptoms of a fundamental defect: it allows an

important ethical decision to turn on a consideration distant from the
real normative stakes of the situation.
The second avenue by which the subversive implications of the
Brandeisian view were contained was the idea that public regulation

might eventually moot issues of professional responsibility. Hurst and
Hart both argued that, when business lawyers failed to curb their clients'
abuses, government typically responded with regulatory constraints."
Of course, the more likely this response, the more the argument for responsibility shaded into the argument for long-run self-interest. The ultimate implication of this line of thought was made clear by Adolph
Berle's prediction that the regulatory state would ultimately liberate

"the bulk of the corporation bar from the profitable but usually undistinguished bondage in which most of it lives"'" because "[t]he moment
... [principles of social responsibility] are seriously infringed, the state
predictably intervenes. In that case an explicit rule of law presently results. Great and powerful interests cannot afford to risk being caught in

a major infringement even though the rule has not become explicit
,,72

If there was one thing the Brandeisians believed in more than professional responsibility, it was the benign capacities of the regulatory
state. This latter commitment tended to dull the edge of the former. If
the regulatory state did its job that well, then legal ethics was more a

3.1 standard applies to litigation circumstances in which counsel is volunteering a position, not to
circumstances where counsel is obliged to produce information, See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSiONAL CoNDUCr Rule 3.1 (1997).
To the extent that the charges against Kaye, Scholer involve withholding information, the
litigation analogy is not to a closing argument, where counsel can argue any nonfrivolous characterization of the evidence, but to a response to a discovery request, where the most plausible standard would be that counsel must comply with a reasonable interpretation (a much narrower category than that of nonfrivolous interpretations) of the request. See Washington State Physicians Ins.
Exch. v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1078 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
To the extent that the charges involve misrepresentation, the situation is again quite different from a closing argument at trial, where counsel's statements are supposed to be understood to
refer to evidence of record only, and the trier can make its own judgment on the plausibility of the
characterizations. In the regulatory context, Kaye, Scholer's statements would naturally be understood to refer not just to the information they had produced but to any relevant information they
were aware of. See William H. Simon, The Kaye, Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duties of Candor
and the Bar'sTemptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 1998).
70. See HART & SACKS, supranote 63, at 857-63; HURST, supra note 63, at 385-95.
71. Adolf A. Berle, CorporationLawyer... Saint or Sinner?: The New Role of the Lawyer
in Modem Society, 76 HARV. L. REV. 430,433 (1962-1963) (book review).
72. Id. at 432.
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matter of prudence than of responsibility.
But hardly anyone today shares this degree of faith in the state. In
retrospect, we can clearly see two defects in the premise-both spectacularly illustrated by the Savings & Loan debacle. First, the chastening power of anticipated intervention works only if the client has a sufficiently long-term perspective. For someone inclined to "go for broke"
and pursue small chances of short-term wealth or who faces near certain
failure if she plays by the rules in the short term, it is ineffectual. These
were precisely the circumstances of the Savings & Loan miscreants.
Second, regulation is no less dependent on the responsible conduct
of officials than private ordering is on the responsible conduct of lawyers. If lawyers resist or betray responsibility, why should public officials do better? The carnival of official ineptitude, cowardice, and corruption in the Savings & Loan scandal is a monument to the proposition
that effective state intervention need not follow "the moment" corporate
irresponsibility threatens the public interest.
I speculate that the practical developments that have made the two
Brandeisian evasions untenable accounts for the bar's current malaise
far more than the theoretical challenges to legal reasoning that Anthony
Kronman blames. The sense of crisis around the litigation system and
the bar's profitable association with mammoth financial scandals exacerbated by inadequacies of various regulatory systems make clear that
issues of responsibility are not moot in any area of practice. There is
still a role for professional responsibility for any lawyer who would accept it. And while that role is responsive to the deepest aspirations of
many lawyers, it is also a frightening one for which the bar's institutions
provide little support.73
V. SELF-BETRAYAL
This frightening aspect of the meaningful work ideal is as important as the hopeful one. For the striking fact about the history of legal
professionalism is that lawyers' betrayal of the ideal has been has con-

73. Kronman and others also suggest that recent developments in the organization of private
practice have narrowed the scope for Brandeis-style lawyering. See KRoNMAN, supra note 44, at
23. Competition has eroded the leverage that lawyers once had over some clients. Moreover, lawyers are increasingly given narrow, short-term tasks that give them little opportunity to gain the
background understanding of the client or the respect from the client needed for the Brandeis role.
This suggestion seems plausible with respect to a broad range of firm practice. But there is a trend
in the opposite direction with inside corporate counsel, whose numbers and power have been
growing. In any event, these developments are too recent to explain why the Brandeisian project
made so little progress to begin with.
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sistent as their espousal of it. The notion of professional redemption
thus belongs to that class of values that includes Christian love, Freudian mature sexuality, and Marxian self-actualization that people are
portrayed as naturally both striving for and turning away from.
Although this dialectic of affirmation and denial seems puzzling,
there are familiar explanations for it in all these doctrines. Sometimes it
seems that people, through weakness or short-sightedness, overvalue the
immediate short-term satisfactions such as material wealth or social
harmony over more important but less readily accessible goals. Sometimes it seems that habituation to their fallen states has made people
cynical about the possibility of something better or has induced a kind
of addiction to the trivial but familiar comforts of the status quo. Sometimes it seems that people lack the courage to accept the dangers of failure that attend efforts to achieve the most exalted goals.
Of course, one might describe the same phenomenon as a rejection
of the ideal on the basis of a calculation that the costs of striving for it
are likely to exceed the benefits. However, such a view has rarely been
asserted, at least publicly, within the legal profession. The more common response has been to defend the profession's detours with the arguments of the Dominant View that we have been examining. In the
Christian, Freudian, and Marxist traditions, it is common to see the
evasions, misrepresentations, and non-sequiturs of such arguments as a
kind of support for the ideals they deny or qualify. The more implausible the arguments, the more strongly they signal bad faith, and the
greater the homage they seem to pay to the ideal.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to insist that one cannot take lawyers' consistent subversion of the professional ideal as a considered rejection of it. The record shows ambivalence, not rejection.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ideal of meaningful work articulated in ProgressiveFunctionalist social theory and implicit in many literary treatments of
professionalism lends support to the critique of the Dominant View and
offers a clue to the underpinnings of the pervasive but vague expressions of moral anxiety within the profession.
The aspirations of many lawyers resonated with the "meaningful
work" ideal that suggests personal fulfillment depends upon the experience of work as the vindication of general norms in particular contexts,
of simultaneous social commitment and self-expression, and of groundedness conjoined with creativity. At times legal professionalism promises to provide this experience. The key professional institutions asso-
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ciated with ideal have been participatory self-regulation and contextual
judgment. Brandeis and his disciples articulated the promise of professional work organized around contextual judgment more ambitiously
than anyone else.
But the proponents of the "meaningful work" ideal tended to shy
away from direct engagement with the Dominant View. The Brandeisians apparently hoped that social trends outside the profession would
obviate the need to do so by pushing the profession in directions that
would vindicate the ideal. They were wrong, however. The ideal of
"meaningful work" is not a historical inevitability. It is at best a political possibility.

